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In recent years donor countries have committed to dramatic increases in the supply of foreign aid to developing countries. Meeting and sustaining such commitments will require sufficient support among donor country voters and taxpayers. The determinants of public opinion in donor countries on foreign aid have received little attention. This paper examines attitudes to foreign aid with a large, multi-level, cross-national study. It outlines a theoretical rationale for support for foreign aid, discussing the importance of both individual factors and economic and social structures. The theory is tested with multi-level models, including both individuallevel and country-level variables to predict positive This paper-a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to make aid more effective in promoting economic development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sknack@ worldbank.org. attitudes. Two datasets are used to measure attitudes in donor countries: (1) the 1995 World Values Survey has information from approximately 6,000 individuals in nine countries and asks a rich battery of questions at the individual-level, and (2) the 2002 Gallup "Voice of the People" survey asks fewer questions of individuals but includes 17 donor countries. Using both surveys combines their distinct strengths and allows tests of individual and national-level theories across disparate samples. The results generally support the predictions that attitudes toward aid are influenced by religiosity, beliefs about the causes of poverty, awareness of international affairs, and trust in people and institutions.
increased aid in donor countries and the share of aid that countries funnel through multilateral agencies. 1 For these reasons, it is important to understand public support for foreign aid.
One existing study (Chong and Gradstein 2006) begins to explore the determinants of support for foreign aid. But two important issues remain: (1) research remains at the individual level without considering the larger social and institutional structures in which public opinion is embedded, and (2) the range of factors, even at the individual-level, that could affect support for foreign aid remains underspecified. In this paper, we argue that individual-level factors such as attitudes toward poverty, as well as country-level factors such as a country's existing level of aid, could affect public opinion in support of foreign aid.
We examine support for foreign aid with a multi-level, cross-national study. We begin by outlining a theoretical rationale for the factors that should affect support for foreign aid, discussing the importance of both individual-level factors and country-level economic and social structures. We introduce two separate datasets to examine attitudes to foreign aid in donor countries: (1) the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values Survey has information from approximately 6,000 individuals in nine countries and asks a rich battery of questions at the individual-level, (2) the 2002 Gallup International "Voice of the People" survey, asks fewer questions of individuals but includes seventeen donor countries 2 . We test our theory with multi-level models, including both individual-level and country-level variables to predict support for foreign aid.
INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID
Citizens of donor countries have opinions on the provision of foreign aid, defined as the transfer of capital or goods from one nation to another. Individuals can support foreign aid disbursement by their country in general. Individuals may also feel,
marginally, that their country should provide more or less aid than current commitments.
1 Causation is not necessarily from public opinion to how it is allocated. However, very few survey respondents are likely to know much about the share of aid channeled through multilaterals. The most plausible interpretation is that support for aid gives policymakers more latitude to spend it in ways that further development goals rather than the donor country's commercial, security or other goals. 2 See www.worldvaluessurvey.org and www.voice-of-the-people.net.
As argued by others (e.g., Mosley 1985) , we assume that the electorate is capable of forming clear opinions about their demand for foreign aid. Previous research has shown that public opinion about world affairs is structured and consistent (Chanley 1999; Shapiro and Page 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) . Indeed, previous work has demonstrated that individuals hold "stable, internally
consistent…generalized beliefs" about global issues such as the trustworthiness of other nations (Brewer et al 2004) . Support for foreign aid can be seen as part of a general orientation to foreign policy labeled "cooperative internationalism" as opposed to "militant internationalism" (Witkopf 1990; Chanley 1999) .
Support for Foreign Aid: Individual Characteristics
Characteristics of individuals are likely to impact support for foreign aid. For example, the religiosity of respondents -their attendance at religious services and the importance of religion to them -is likely to increase support for aid. Most religious teachings discuss relief for the poor. Jewish and Christian Biblical teachings, for example, urge individuals and leaders to support the poor, the sick, widows, travelers, and orphans. Proverbs 22:9 states: "Those who are generous are blessed, for they share their bread with the poor." Certainly, religion has been found to impact altruism of other types such as philanthropy (Wuthnow and Hodgkinson 1990) and trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; La Porta et al. 1997; Fishman and Khanna 1999) , as well as a variety of economic attitudes (Guiso et al. 2003) . And surveys show that demand for aid is partly altruistic -individuals cite moral or humanitarian obligations to help others (Mosley 1985 , citing Bowles 1978 . In short, there are a variety of reasons to expect that those who are more religious will express greater support for foreign aid.
In a similar manner, an individual's position on poverty should influence their support for aid. Individuals likely extrapolate from their beliefs about the poor, or their general ideological position, in making decisions about supporting the poor in other countries. If individuals feel that the poor are lazy, or that they can easily escape poverty, then they are unlikely to support aid, either domestically or abroad. The theoretical argument we make here is related to low-information rationality -that citizens use information shortcuts to allow opinions on politics even when they lack expert knowledge (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1984) . Individuals "cope with an extraordinarily confusing world…by structuring view about specific foreign policies according to their more general and abstract beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987:114) . For example, economic individualism has been linked to attitudes about welfare policy (Feldman 1983 (Page and Shapiro 1992) . Certain occupations, such as being a teacher, or a member of the armed services, are more likely than others to expose individuals to international affairs.
A fourth theoretical perspective suggests that certain psychological characteristics, such as a sense of agency or trust in others, are also likely to affect support for foreign aid. Personality traits are understood to develop early in the life course, influence both the perception and interpretation of events, and are generally stable, consistent, and enduring. Political psychologists therefore argue that "the influence of basic traits such as anxiety, hostility, or low self-esteem should be both pervasive and distinctive, exerting a consistent and unifying pressure upon a wide range of responses" (Sniderman and Citrin 1971:402) . Indeed, Sniderman and Citrin (1971) find that self-esteem is related to isolationism. Further, previous work links trust to public opinion about world affairs (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002; Popkin and Dimock 2000: Uslaner 2002) . For example, Uslaner (2002:196) argues that those who trust have "greater comfort" with individuals unlike themselves, including those from other nations.
In discussing trust, it is worth noting that individuals can trust organizations and institutions as well as generalized others (Barber 1983; Giddens 1990; Paxton 1999; Brewer et al. 2004) . Trust in the government, for example, has been defined as a "general orientation toward the government predicated upon people's normative expectations of government operation." (Hetherington and Globetti 2002:254; Miller 1974 and Globetti (2002) argue that trust in the government is particularly important when the benefits of the government's activity accrue to others (as it would with foreign aid).
Further, citizens who are confident in their government's abilities are more likely to believe it can successfully intervene in other nations (Popkin and Dimock 2000) . And previous research has related pride in one's country with more positive attitudes toward trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005) .
Besides trust in the government, trust in international institutions, such as the World Bank, UN or international NGOs may also impact whether an individual feels that foreign aid funds will be used wisely or wasted (see also Brewer et al. 2004 (Conover and Sapiro 1993) . Chong and Gradstein (2006) find no differences between the genders in looking across multiple donor countries. However, there are significant gender differences within many countries, with men more supportive of aid in some countries and women more supportive in others. There is no obvious explanation for these conflicting findings.
Income may also affect an individual's support for foreign aid. Those with higher incomes have the flexibility to take risks and this is likely to encourage trusting and altruistic behaviors of all kinds. Generally, some research suggests that individuals structure attitudes on economic issues along the rich/poor class schema (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985) . In testing foreign aid directly, Chong and Gradstein (2006) find that support for foreign aid increases with income.
Another demographic factor that could change an individual's attitude about foreign aid is the significant life-course event of having a child. The direction of effect is unclear, however. On the one hand, children may act to broaden an individual's perspective, helping them be more sympathetic to others and thereby increase support for foreign aid. On the other hand, parents may feel the need to focus resources on their own children and therefore favor more domestic policies over international ones.
Support for Foreign Aid: Contextual Effects
To this point, we have focused on individual-level influences on support for foreign aid. But the aggregate social and institutional features of a nation may also encourage or discourage support. We must distinguish theory at the individual level (e.g., higher income increases support for foreign aid) from theory at the aggregate level (e.g., countries with higher GDP per capita display more support for foreign aid).
Countries vary systematically on political, economic, and cultural characteristics, all of which could impact individual levels of support.
To 
Individual-Level Independent Variables
In the World Values Survey analyses, the individual-level independent variables correspond to the four theories outlined above. Lastly, the WVS analyses include three psychological characteristics.
Respondents indicated their SATISFACTION WITH THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION on a 1 to 10
scale with higher values indicating greater satisfaction. AGENCY is also measured as a 1 to 10 scale, with higher values indicating a feeling of "free choice and control." TRUST is assessed with the question, "generally, speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"
The WVS measures INCOME as quintiles within each country's income structure.
Three other demographic variables are included in the WVS analysis: a respondents AGE, whether the respondent is FEMALE, and whether a respondent has ANY CHILDREN. along a four category scale, from "a lot of trust" to "no trust at all."
Contextual-Level Independent Variables
Analysis is restricted to the 22 donor countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Of these, 19 appear either in our analysis of WVS data (2), Gallup data (10), or both (7). Belgium, France, and Greece are missing from both surveys. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who favor aid only to non-corrupt countries is always less than the % who favor aid in general, except in the United States. Table 1 also provides level-2 summary statistics for the GI sample. These rows demonstrate considerable variability across countries in all of these variables, including support for foreign aid. Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . Richer countries tend to provide more aid.
The Multi-Level Model
To test the theories outlined above, we use multilevel models that simultaneously estimate individual-and country-level effects. The data in both surveys are hierarchically organized with individuals nested within countries, and information at the both the individual level and the country level is used to determine support for foreign aid. We use the statistical package HLM 6.04 for the analyses (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon 2001) .
For the WVS analysis, the full specification of level one of the multi-level model is: where p ij is the probability that respondent i in country j supports giving more foreign aid (GIVE MORE FOREIGN AID =1). Preliminary random-coefficients models indicated that employed and political interest did not vary and were therefore fixed. All other coefficients were estimated as random.
In analyses of both surveys, the specification of the first country-level model is:
With only 9 countries in the WVS analysis, the level-two variables are included sequentially. Subsequent level-two models include GDP, MILITARY SPENDING POPULATION, AND LOG COLONIES in place of ODA. In GI, the same level-two variables are assessed.
In both the WVS analyses and the GI analyses, all non-dummy individual-level independent variables are grand-mean centered, creating a variable with a mean of zero across all the cases. Grand-mean centering holds compositional differences in individual characteristics constant and is appropriate when aggregate versions of the variables are not included in the model. Weights are included to compensate for sampling issues in the GI analyses. HLM 6.04 uses a weighting technique developed for hierarchical data (Pfefferman et al. 1998 ).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Calculating the ICC demonstrates that approximately ten percent of the total variance in support for foreign aid can be attributed to between-country differences (7% in the WVS and 13% in GI). 7 Thus, a nontrivial amount of the variance in support occurs across countries and it is important to explain this variation as well as the variation within countries. Indeed, a simple ANOVA indicates that there is statistically significant country-level variance in support for foreign aid in both analyses. That is, support for foreign aid varies a significant amount across countries.
We begin our discussion of the results with the WVS analyses. Table 4 tests individual-level theories of support for foreign aid. These five models consider only individual-level effects but account for the clustering of individual respondents within countries with a random coefficients regression model (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992:20) .
A preliminary look across the models in Table 4 suggests that all four theories of individual differences in support for foreign aid find some support. individual were instead female, her predicted probability would be .78, leading to a change in the predicted probability of .06 -a fairly strong effect.
Although the GI survey has fewer individual-level variables in general, it does
have an expanded set of questions on trust. As in the WVS analysis, TRUST has a positive and significant effect on support for more foreign aid. Declaring trust in others increases the odds of favoring aid by approximately 50%. Models 3-5 show substantial differences in the effect of trusting particular institutions --GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK, and NGOS. Trust in one's own government does not significantly increase an individual's support for aid. Contrast the lack of effect of trust in one's own government to the significant, but small, effect of trust in international donor institutions (the UN and World Bank) and the significant and large coefficient for trust in NGOs. Each one-unit increase in expressed trust in international donors leads to a 7% increase in the odds of favoring more aid to poor countries. Each one-unit increase in trust in NGOs, however, leads to a 57% increase in the odds of favoring more aid to poor countries. Coefficients on ODA in Table 6 are consistent with these arguments. Although they are not significant at conventional levels, the ODA coefficient is positive in the WVS analysis and negative in the GI analysis. In the GI analyses it becomes highly significant if two outlying cases, the U.S. and Japan, are dropped (new coefficient = -1.41). Interpreting this effect size suggests that if a country were to increase from an average level of foreign aid, about 0.5% of GNP, to 0.75% of GNP, the odds of a citizen's support for foreign aid would decrease by 30%. So there is some evidence for the hypothesis that citizens in countries with high levels of existing aid express less support for increasing aid than citizens from other countries.
Across both surveys, the GDP of a society has a significantly negative effect on support for foreign aid. A $1000 increase in income per capita is expected to decrease the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 4%. A one standard deviation change in income per capita ($6,500 in GI) leads to a 23% decrease in the odds.
Interestingly, therefore, in contrast to the generally positive effect of socio-economic status on support for foreign aid at the individual-level, in the aggregate, richer countries do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid.
The results for military spending differ across the WVS and GI analyses. Military
Spending negatively effects support for foreign aid in the smaller WVS sample, but not in the larger GI sample. Even using the WVS, however, this finding is highly sensitive to inclusion of the United States. The coefficient on Military Spending is substantially reduced and becomes non-significant if the U.S. is removed from the analysis. Although U.S. citizens may view their country as fulfilling its global citizenship duties through its 9 If preferences over aid levels were a sufficiently important determinant of actual aid levels, variations in aid levels among donor countries could merely reflect variations in the preferences of their respective median voters. Under this strong assumption, we should observe, in each donor country in the GI survey, a roughly equal number of respondents favoring increases and decreases in aid. In most countries, however, far more respondents support increasing than decreasing aid.
high military spending, this hypothesis does not generalize to other countries.
In support of a "global awareness" perspective, citizens in countries with larger populations show reduced support for foreign aid. The WVS and GI samples both show a significant negative effect of population size on support for foreign aid. That is, in countries with larger populations citizens appear less willing to assist disadvantaged people across national boundaries. But the WVS result is again heavily influenced by the United States -the coefficient is approximately halved and loses significance if the U.S.
is removed from the analysis. The GI analyses are also influenced by the U.S., but to a lesser extent. There, the coefficient remains largely stable but loses significance, reaching only p<.10.
Finally, we see the more expansive colonial powers exhibit greater support for foreign aid. A 10% increase in number of former colonies is expected to increase the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 2%. While not an extremely strong effect size, it can make a substantial difference in countries that have colonized many countries, namely the U.K., France, and Spain. Increasing colonies by 50% is expected to increase the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 12%.
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Overall, we see that both individual-level and contextual-level variables have effects on support for foreign aid. At the individual level, we find some support for all five theoretical perspectives: demographic factors matter, as does religion, attention outside one's country, left/right position and attitudes toward poverty, and psychological characteristics. At the aggregate level, national aid disbursement impacts public opinion, as does GDP and links to former colonies.
10 Auxiliary analyses considered other country-level variables, including income growth rates, income inequality, foreign-born, exports, unemployment, tax revenue, and estimates of private charitable giving. In some cases the variable was not significant in either survey, e.g., exports measured as a share of GDP. Other variables were significant in one survey and not another. For example, the percent foreign born (including refugees) was negative and significant in GI and non-significant in the WVS. In some cases, results for these variables were significant but with differing signs in the two surveys. For example, the average growth rate for the preceding 5 years has a positive effect in the GI sample, but negative in the WVS sample. Similarly, income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) was positive for the GI countries, but negative for the WVS sample. Chong and Gradstein (2006) obtained a similar negative effect of inequality using the WVS, but it is contradicted by findings from the larger GI sample.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated public attitudes toward foreign aid across 19 donor countries. We argued that both individual-and country-level factors contribute to support for foreign aid. Using data from two sources, the World Values Survey, and the Gallup International Voice of the People Survey, we tested theories using multilevel models. Using two surveys allowed us to combine their distinct strengths and provide tests of our individual-and national-level theories across disparate samples.
Like the sole previous study on this topic (Chong and Gradstein 2006) , our paper demonstrates that individual-level factors matter to support for foreign aid. But this paper goes beyond a focus on demographic variables to test hypotheses related to a respondent's religiosity, attitudes about poverty, attention to international affairs, and Indeed, the U.S. population is unique among the donor countries in its attention to corruption, being the only country where a higher percentage of respondents favor a more restrictive policy of giving only to non-corrupt countries. Concerns about government corruption, along with stronger traditions of (and tax incentives for) private philanthropy, likely explain Americans' relatively high levels of private giving to charitable organizations providing non-official aid.
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Numerous respondent-level attitudes and behaviors measured in the WVS were found to be associated with support for aid. On several of those variables, Americans on the whole tend toward the extremes among the 9 donor countries represented in the survey. However, some of these differences should increase support for aid among 12 Americans' aid giving remains low by DAC standards even when private giving is included. Americans give about 2% of their incomes to charities, and only about 2% of that amount goes to international charities, or .04% of income. Adding this amount to U.S. ODA would not close most of the gap between U.S. and other donors' aid/GNI levels, even if private giving in other donors is ignored. Moreover, while private charitable giving is lower in other donor countries, a higher percentage of their charitable giving goes to international charities (Roodman and Standley, 2006 ).
Americans while others should reduce it, with little net effect. Low trust in people, rightof-center ideology, and beliefs that the poor are lazy and can escape poverty are all significantly associated with lower support for aid. Only 36% of Americans agree people can be trusted most of the time, lower than in 7 of the other 8 countries. The U.S. ranks first in agreement that poor people are lazy and lack willpower; it ranks third in agreement that poor people can escape poverty, and in being right-of-center ideologically. However, it also ranks at the top -by a wide margin -in church attendance, and above average on political interest and TV watching. Those three variables are all associated with stronger support for aid giving.
Satisfaction with one's financial situation in the WVS analysis, and trust in NGOs and international institutions in the GI analysis, are also associated with greater support for aid. The U.S. ranks in the middle among donor countries on these variables, so they cannot account for Americans' low support for aid.
It is possible that the implications of some of these attitudinal and behavioral variables differ across countries. For example, interest in politics and TV consumption may increase Americans' knowledge of foreign affairs and development issues less than it does in smaller countries. Exploring these nuances is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
Foreign aid helps recipient countries develop infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and address humanitarian crises while providing an important foreign policy tool for donor nations. Paul Collier, in his recent book on foreign aid, argues that improving the effectiveness of aid requires that donors be more willing to accept risks and hence a higher rate of failure. But, "at present, the powerful force of public opinion is driving agencies in precisely the opposite direction. They cannot afford failure....aid 0.100 t .05 one-tailed; * .05 two-tailed; ** .01 two-tailed; *** .001 two-tailed a Coefficient becomes significantly negative (-1.41, p<.001) if two outlying cases, the U.S. and Japan, are removed from the analysis. b Coefficient is reduced and becomes nonsignificant if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis. c Coefficient is reduced and becomes nonsignificant if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis. d Coefficient is unchanged but reduces significance (p<.1) if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis.
Note: All WVS models include the 20 variables at level 1. All Gallup models include the 8 variables at level 1.
